The new forgotten war
Some might argue that a “just war” is an oxymoron, but after 9/11, the war in Afghanistan was, in my opinion, a fair and honest compromise. I felt the same way about the Gulf War when Iraq invaded Kuwait. When the Northern Alliance joined our forces, it seemed that we were well on our way to achieving our objectives in Afghanistan, and our campaign seemed to have been perceived as a success. Reinforcing this perception, our policy makers and experts told us that we have nothing more to fear since al Qaeda and its sponsor regime, the Taliban, are gone and the country has a new pro-Western government. Unfortunately, the facts manifestly suggest otherwise.
Suddenly, the news about Afghanistan goes from page 8 to page 4 in the newspapers. Suddenly, Google related sites have increased. Suddenly, journalists from the front report that the war is escalating. What began as a just and justified action after 9/11 has turned into what some call a half war. Despite the turn to the contrary, we have not succeeded in crushing the Taliban and al Qaeda, nor have we turned their ideology, Islamic totalitarianism, into a lost cause. Instead, the Bush administration’s reluctance to fight more decisively, if not ruthlessly, seems to have increased the enthusiasm of the jihadists.
The proof is in the pudding. As this article is being written, the US military is quietly carrying out the largest military offensive in Afghanistan since our troops invaded that country in 2001. “The Taliban have returned and we have the next 90 days to crush them,” he said. a senior US military officer. The offensive, “Operation Mountain Push,” involves nearly 11,000 US troops and is focused on four southern Afghan provinces.
“Return”, in fact. The Taliban have re-emerged and their spiritual leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, is still at large, probably in Pakistan, where our soldiers cannot operate. Armed with a store of lethal weapons, Taliban and al Qaeda soldiers have renewed their offensive. Fueled by money from the drug (opium) trade and the recruitment of fighters, they fight fiercely to regain power. In recent weeks they have mounted a series of suicide and rocket attacks against US and NATO forces; in fact, more US soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan in the past 18 months than during the height of the war. Taliban forces have besieged several southern provinces and officials estimate that in some the Taliban outnumber the Afghan National Army and police. The Taliban are even said to boldly walk through villages brandishing Kalashnikovs.
How can it be that four years into the war, the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters are once again a serious threat? Well, for starters, leaders like Mullah Omar “don’t wield power like a military general does,” Seth Jones, an analyst at the California-based think tank RAND Corp., wrote in the spring issue of Survival magazine. . Instead, they leave “tactical and operational” control to local cells, “acting as franchises.” As we learned after 9/11, Al-Qaeda operates in the same way.
Clearly, the loose alliance opposed to the Karzai government and the US-led reconstruction has not been destroyed nor has its spirit been crushed. With moral fortitude, he rallied and launched a bold comeback for a number of reasons, including but not limited to:
1) First, the seemingly endless (and, for many, questionable) war in Iraq has distracted the US from the difficult task of suppressing the Taliban and rebuilding Afghanistan. Iraq has sucked up resources and money that could have been better sent to Afghanistan.
2) The rules of engagement are terribly confusing and confusing. In this regard, some argue that victory in Afghanistan requires two things: a) that we had to destroy the Taliban by focusing exclusively on capturing or killing them and B) that we had to ensure that a non-Islamic and non-threatening regime would take their place. But others argue that we should try to be more strategic and go after Taliban fighters only if we simultaneously show “compassion” towards the Afghans. They add that our purpose in being in Afghanistan is not to superimpose our style of government on the Afghan people. Adding to the confusion, some countries allied with the US in Afghanistan will fight; another will not.
3 The Taliban know that Afghan citizens are unlikely to risk their lives to support Karzai’s government, which many view as corrupt. The current problem in Afghanistan may have as much to do with weak government institutions as with the strong enemy.
4) The insurgents have found a safe haven in Pakistan, staying out of reach of Afghan and international security forces. Apparently, the pro-Taliban policy of the Pakistani government changed under US pressure after 9/11, but the key word here is “apparently”, and Karzai knows it very well.
The Insurgents appear to be betting that the West does not have the political strength to stick around for the long haul. However, it is said that deploying troops to support the government of President Hamid Karzai and keeping them there is, I believe, a sacrifice worth making. After all, 9/11 demonstrated what happened the last time the world community left Afghanistan. Whichever philosophical path we follow and no matter how we reconcile our rules of engagement, it’s time for the Bush administration to pick up the pace (and “Operation Mountain Thrust” is a good start). At the very least, we owe a lot to our soldiers fighting there. Afghanistan must not become a forgotten war.
“Too bad we didn’t get distracted by other adventures. Think about how Afghanistan ‘could’ have been the shining light of democracy in the Middle East. Oh, if only they had more oil!” Posted to the web on Jun 20, 2006 at 4:22:53 pm by someone named kharma